

distances between Great Britain and the several Governments on the west coast of South America, the mails being transported by a line of British steam packets plying between Panama and Callao, and adding to the facilities of intermediate ports. On letters sent from the United States, the rate of postage for which the United States has to account to the British Post-Office, under this arrangement, is eight cents, the single letter between Panama and Baños de Hualtaco, New Granada, two cents, and between Callao and Peru; and twenty-four cents between Panama and any other port on said coast. On letters received the same packet postage, as above, is required to be prepaid. On letters above rates, respectively, the United States pays postage of twenty cents, and the United States pays twenty-four cents the single rate in all other cases, has to be paid. On newspapers the British packet postage is six cents, to which is added the United States postage

that there is necessity for a squadron of so many gunboats on the Coast of Africa, and that notice should be given to Great Britain, under the terms of the treaty in regard to the suppression of the slave-trade, so as to be relieved from the obligations. The commerce on that coast has of late years increased so great and American ships trading in that region have multiplied so much, that I am confident the squadron is necessary to protect the commerce and suppress the slave-trade. In the conduct of the Commander of the St. Louis (Mid-berstean Squadron), this comments:-

In calling to your attention to the movements of this squadron, I cannot omit an especial reference to the conduct of Commander Ingraham, while in command of the St. Louis at Smyrna. And while separated from him from the country's flag. Violence was committed on the personal liberty of a man entitled to the protection of

the powers with whom we are most likely to come into future conflicts, and the great deep is the bastion on which we must stand. We are not un mindful of the fact that the mighty development of strength and force which the nationalism, the energy, the material skill and mercantile marine of a great nation would soon rally to our assistance. Other nations, in addition to our large sea navies, have the immense resources of their marine, and their armies and steamships also; but again—what have we to defend and protect? We have an Atlantic coast much more than two thousand miles, stretching from the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, and the magnificent Rio Grande to the St. Croix. Simultaneously, we have a Pacific Coast extending for many hundred miles, from the confines of Mexico to the far Northwest, an inviting country rapidly becoming populated—totally unprotected. Separated from the rest of the world by the great oceans, and deserts from the military power of the Government, a new empire has to be by magic spring into existence. San

are fifteen, often eighteen, and more than twenty years. The officers, who are thus receiving pay, protect the nation of those below them who have seen more than a few years' service at sea, and have helped to give their ship a name. There are inefficient officers who have done duty on sea or shore, for twelve, fifteen, and twenty years: there are "Lieutenants" who have seen the service of some higher grade, and receive half as much pay. There are many "passengers" who have no sea service, whose pay on leave is six hundred dollars a year, and there are their superiors in rank, of less than twenty years' service, whose pay is twenty-five hundred dollars.

Grade of rank and position is the animating element in the sailor's mind. It is the incentive to the man, the vigor to the arm, the courage to the heart, buoyant to the spirits of the faithful officer, and there is a peculiar sensitiveness to the slightest neglect. But in a peculiar

regarding some substitute, and the action of Congress on the subject, and severely on forbearance and integrity of officers, and the error of our senses. This subject has engaged my attention, and anxious inquiry, and I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion against its restoration. Having related many of the ships in commission, conversed with several officers, and listened to the narratives of those who have had the command of large crews since 1850, my decided conviction, concentered in, two points, is, that the restoration of the discipline of the officers who originally organized its abolition, is that which will create the most efficient and economical public service. But at the same time I cannot too strongly urge the policy of legalizing some substitute, as a means of lessening the evils of the disorderly navy system, and but little punishment to them.